








      
 






This paper compares the Nash Bargaining Solution and market outcomes in a simple n-person 
exchange economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect to responsiveness of 
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  The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) (Nash, 1950) is an appealing cooperative solution 
concept for bargaining games, in part because it approximates the equilibrium of a well-defined 
noncooperative bargaining procedure (Binmore, 1980; Rubinstein, 1982; Binmore, Rubinstein 
and Wolinsky, 1986; Krishna and Serrano, 1996).  This approximation result holds where utility 
is transferable, so a fixed surplus is being divided.  The popularity of the NBS is possibly also 
driven by its simplicity: it involves maximizing a simple objective function, and is easily 
calculated.  The NBS is a component of theories ranging from those explaining the nature of the 
firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986) to those examining trade wars and trade agreements (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1995).   
  The n-person version of the NBS is a natural extension of Nash’s original formulation 
(Harsanyi, 1977, Ch. 10), derived either through consistency requirements with the set of 
bilateral bargaining subgames, or through direct extensions of Nash’s axioms. In the n-player 
case, it is also plausible to think of resource allocation being governed by market outcomes with 
price-taking behavior, rather than by bargaining.  Such behavior is typically motivated by 
individuals being small relative to the market (n is large), and competitive equilibrium with 
price-taking is, of course, a major aspect of the economic theory of resource allocation.   
  This paper compares the NBS and market outcomes in a simple n-person game. The NBS 
may be thought of as approximating the n-person noncooperative bargaining game of Krishna 





1  The market outcome, or price-taking equilibrium, as usual, is taken as an 
approximation to the outcome of some institutional set-up involving bids and asks, posted prices, 
etc.  The purpose of the analysis is to gain some insight into the workings of these two 
equilibrium concepts.  The analysis is specific in scope, and does not attempt to model pairwise 
matching mechanisms, as has been done in several papers exploring the relationship between 
bargaining and markets (Gale, 1987; Binmore and Herrero, 1988; Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 
1990). On the other hand, the ubiquity of both the NBS and of competitive models makes a more 
precise understanding of differences in their outcomes very useful. 
  It is worth stressing the value of the comparison in the context of the number of market 
participants. There is a common view that competitive equilibrium requires large numbers of 
participants in the market. This perspective is driven by the idea of small size relative to the 
market as a justification for price-taking behavior. The papers by Gale, Binmore and Herrero and 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky all use this perspective, examining how increasing the number of 
participants leads to convergence of the outcome of a bargaining model to a Walrasian 
equilibrium. We would argue that this is not the only way of approaching competitive 
equilibrium. In particular, institutions such as the continuous double auction have been used in 
experiments with relatively small numbers of participants (as few as 20), and rapid convergence 
to competitive equilibrium obtained.  
  For example, Smith (1962), in his pioneering paper, which used experiments to 
demonstrate convergence to competitive equilibrium, is categorical on this point: “These markets 
are also a replica of real markets in that they are composed of a practical number of marketers, 
say twenty, thirty, or forty. We do not require an indefinitely large number of marketers, which is 
                                                           





usually supposed necessary for the existence of “pure” competition” (p. 115). Interestingly, 
Chamberlin’s precursor experiments (Chamberlin, 1948), in which he found enough divergence 
from competitive equilibrium to express increased “skepticism as to why actual prices should in 
any literal sense tend toward equilibrium during the course of a market,” are critiqued by Smith 
precisely because they rely on buyers and sellers who “circulate and engage in bilateral haggling 
and bargaining” (Smith, 1962, footnote 5, p. 114). The comparison of these two sets of 
experiments illustrates how markets and bargaining institutions can be studied for similar 
numbers of traders. 
 
Model  
  There are n individuals, indexed by subscript i, i = 1, …, n.  Their utilities are ui, and their 
utilities in the case of no agreement are di.  In order to compare the bargaining and market 
outcomes, we take the simplest possible case of trade.  There are two goods, w and y, and 
individual i’s utility function is given by 
(1)   .  i i i i i i y ) w ( v ) y , w ( u + =
Hence the utility function is quasilinear, and utility is fully transferable. We assume that vi is 
twice-differentiable and strictly concave, and that vi(0) = 0 for all i.  We denote the initial 
allocations (endowments) and utilities by  ; the NBS allocations and utilities by 
; and the competitive market outcomes and utilities by  .  Hence, in 
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  Let the total surplus in the case of agreement be denoted by S.  This quantity is a 
constant, due to the quasilinear utility functions.  Since the bargaining solution is Pareto 
efficient, 












i i ) y ) w ( v ( ) y ) w ( v ( S .   
Since the competitive market outcome is also Pareto efficient, the total surplus (or gains from 
trade) is the same in that case.  Hence the superscript ‘B’ in the last equation can equivalently be 
replaced by ‘M’.  Note that, since there is only trade and no production, the aggregate quantity of 
y is fixed, and (2) can be simplified to 
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Furthermore, the quasilinear utility functions imply that, at any Pareto efficient allocation, 
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Only the allocation of the numeraire y will differ between the NBS and the market outcome. 
 
Nash Bargaining Outcome 




i i ) u u ( , subject to individual 
rationality and feasibility. The NBS is easily shown to satisfy 
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2 Suppose not, in which case  for some i.  Then the marginal utilities differ for all individuals across the 
bargaining and market solutions, since they are equal across individuals within each case. But then the total amount 








Hence, the NBS involves an equal sharing of the surplus that results from the Pareto efficient 
reallocation of the two goods, w and y.  This is, of course, a well-known property. 
 
Competitive Market Outcome 
 Let  y be the numeraire good in the competitive market case, and let the price of w be pw.  
Then in the competitive equilibrium, each individual maximizes ui subject to the budget 
constraint 
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In equilibrium, therefore, for each individual i, 
(5)   ,   ) w ( v p
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and the net transfer of the numeraire is
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The utility of individual i in the competitive market equilibrium is, therefore, 
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and the utility gain of individual i is  
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It is easy to check that this expression is positive, whatever the direction of the trade, when vi is 
strictly concave.   
                                                           




  It is clear that equations (3) and (8) are very different in structure, and our goal is to 
compare these two outcomes. As an illustration of the different forces driving the gains to trade 
in the two cases, consider an agent i whose endowment is such that  . It is clear 
from (8) that this individual has no gains from trade in the competitive market outcome. 
However, as long as other agents are trading, agent i gains in the Nash Bargaining outcome, as 
the total surplus is split equally (equation (3)). Thus, an individual in the latter case can benefit 
even when not directly involved in the trades that take place. In the remainder of the paper, we 
will look for more specific results comparing gains from trade and how they are affected by 
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Results 
  We first consider the effect of endowments on the gains from trade. While equation (3) 
indicates that the utility gain in the NBS is the same for each individual, and independent of the 
nature of preferences, this is not the case for the competitive market outcome.  In fact, individual 
endowments systematically affect the market outcome.  In particular, we have Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 
If individuals have identical utility functions, then those who make the smallest (largest) trades 
gain the least (most) in the competitive market outcome. 
Proof 
If utility functions are identical, then, from (5), in the competitive market equilibrium,  is 
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where we can now drop the subscript on the w
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We have  and  . Since  < 0, f is strictly 
concave with a maximum at w
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M. In other words, the utility gain is smallest (largest) for those whose trades are 
smallest  (largest).       ❚  
 
Corollary 1 
In the case of Proposition 1, individuals who trade more than average in the competitive market 
equilibrium are better off than in the NBS. 
Proof 
Since the total utility gain from reallocation of the goods is the same in the two cases, the result 
follows  immediately.       ❚  
 
  It might seem that this result is a straightforward consequence of the symmetry required 
in the Nash axioms: utility gains are equal in the NBS, whereas in the competitive equilibrium, it 
is marginal utility that matters.  However, if we think of the NBS as approximating a 
noncooperative bargaining procedure, then the equal gains can be thought of as a consequence of 




outcome does not lead to this kind of equal gain (being driven by the different logic of marginal 
utility). 
  Corollary 1 compares the NBS and the competitive outcome when preferences are 
identical but endowments are different.  One may also ask what happens when endowments are 
identical but preferences are different.  In the case of quasilinear preferences, the natural 
dimension of variation of preferences is in risk aversion: for example, the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion is given by  i i i v / v A ′ ′ ′ − = .  Of course, in the certainty case treated here, risk aversion 
is simply a convenient way of capturing the nature of the curvature of the utility function, and 
should be interpreted as such. Treating Ai as a parameter that captures variation in preferences, 
and assuming identical endowments, equation (8) becomes 
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Furthermore, from (5),  , so we may write . We may 
substitute from (5), so that (11) becomes 
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Again using (5), the first and last terms on the RHS of (13) cancel out, so it reduces to  





























We may now derive the following result. 
 
Proposition 2 
If individuals in the economy have identical endowments but preferences with differing levels of 
constant absolute risk aversion, then the following holds: 
(i)  If relative risk aversions are greater than 1, then the gains from trade are smaller for 
more risk averse buyers of w and greater for more risk averse sellers. 
(ii)  If relative risk aversions are less than 1, then the gains from trade are greater for more 
risk averse buyers of w and smaller for more risk averse sellers. 
Proof 
In the case of constant absolute risk aversion, the (canonical) utility function is given by 
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We first establish a relationship between risk aversion and who is a net buyer or seller of w. 
From (5),  ) ln( ) , ( 1
p
A
A A p w = .  
Hence,  [ ] [ ] Aw A p w
A p
A
A A − = − = 1 ) ln( 1 ) , ( 2 2
1 1 . 
Since R = Aw is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, we have that 
(15)  wA(p, A) > (<) 0 as R < (>) 1.  
In words, the optimized level of w increases (decreases) in A for R <(>) 1. Since all individuals 
have the same initial endowment, it follows that there is a cutoff value A* for the risk aversion 




We next examine how the gains from trade vary with the level of risk aversion. Using (14) and 
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∂ − − − , so that the sign of this latter derivative 
depends on whether R <(>) 1. 
 
Hence, from (15) and (16), and the last equalities, we have the following four cases: 
  R > 1  R < 1 
M
i w > w
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This proves the result as stated. 
Since, irrespective of the magnitude of R relative to 1, it is those with larger equilibrium 
trades who have higher gains from trade,
4 we also have the following consequence of the 
equality of gains in the NBS. 
 
                                                           
4 For example, if R < 1, w is increasing in A, so that larger buyers are more risk averse, while larger sellers are less 






In the economy of Proposition 2, those individuals with trades above a certain level (i.e., those 
with more extreme risk aversion parameters) are better off with the competitive market outcome 
than in the NBS. 
 
  It is possible to conceive of examples where the utility gain of individuals with 
preferences exhibiting less extreme risk aversion is higher in the competitive equilibrium.  The 
more general point, therefore, is that the utility gains in the market outcome are sensitive to these 
risk attitudes, while they are irrelevant for the NBS. 
  Another significant way that the NBS and the competitive market outcome differ is in the 




i w decreases, then pw, which is the 
(shadow) price of this good
5, must increase, reflecting the increased relative scarcity of w.  From 
(2)′, we see that S, the total gains from trade, may increase or decrease in general, though each 
part of the right-hand side will go down.  The precise effect will depend on how the endowment 
reduction is distributed.  However, it remains true, from equation (3), that the gains from Nash 
bargaining are equally distributed.  
  The situation is quite different in the case of the competitive equilibrium.  In that case, 
the gains from trade depend very heavily on being a net buyer or seller of wi.  We have 
Proposition 3. 
 
                                                           











A marginal decrease in the total endowment of w increases the utility gain of sellers whose 
endowment does not decrease and decreases the utility gain of buyers of the good whose 
endowment does not increase. 
Proof 
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The simplest case to consider is where the individual endowment is unchanged.  Then the second 







 because of the increased relative scarcity of the 
good, the utility gain decreases for buyers of w and increases for sellers whose endowments are 
unchanged, as a result of a decrease in the total endowment.  The remainder of the proposition is 
demonstrated by noting that the term in the second set of parentheses is positive for sellers and 
negative for buyers.  The appropriate sign of the last derivative then reinforces the effect of the 
first  term.      ❚  
  The interest of the above result lies in the comparison of the NBS and market outcome.  
The following corollary is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 3. 
 
Corollary 3 
If a marginal reduction in the total endowment of w is made entirely at the expense of buyers of 
the good in a competitive equilibrium, then the gains from trade of all buyers (sellers) are 
lowered (raised).  In contrast, in the NBS, such a reduction in the endowment has the same effect 
on the utility gain of all individuals. 
 
  Yet another interesting comparison between the NBS and market outcomes is in their 
different responses to transfers of endowment from one individual to another.  In this simple 
model, an increase in an individual's endowment at the expense of another can only increase that 







If individual preferences are identical, and individual i receives a small transfer of endowment of 
w from individual j, then 
(a) In the competitive outcome, i's utility gain increases if he is a net seller of w and decreases if 
he is a net buyer. 
(b) In the NBS, i's utility gain increases if his initial endowment exceeds that of j, and decreases 
if it is less than that of j. 
Proof 
From (5), with identical preferences and strict concavity, competitive equilibrium allocations of 
w are all equal.  This is also true for the NBS.  If the total endowment of w is unchanged, then 
final allocations of w are unchanged for both the market outcome and the NBS. Given these 
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by differentiating (8) and using (5),  
and 
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  Note that the result is in keeping with the different underlying forces in the two 
outcomes: for the market outcome, i's position in the market (buyer or seller) is what matters, not 
his position relative to individual j.  On the other hand, only that relative initial position matters 
for the NBS, while the direction of trade is irrelevant. 
  By taking the situation analyzed in Proposition 4, and further restricting attention to the 
two-person case, we can derive a final result, which compares utility gains in the bargaining and 
market outcomes. The comparison turns out to depend on the third derivative of the utility 
function, which in turn can be related to measures of risk aversion. Thus, the next result 
complements the results of Proposition 2. Note that while the result is stated for a two-person 
economy, it can be applied to an economy of any size, where the two types of preferences in the 
proposition are replicated an equal number of times. This answers the potential objection that the 
numbers are too small for this to be a meaningful setting for competition. 
 
Proposition 5 
Consider a two-person version of the exchange economy considered in this paper, with identical 
quasilinear utility functions, and 1 being a net seller of good w. A transfer of endowment of good 
w from individual 2 to individual 1 increases individual 1’s utilit y  m o r e  ( l e s s )  i n  t h e  N a s h  
bargaining case versus the competitive market outcome if v′ is strictly convex (concave). 
Proof 
In the competitive market outcome, 1’s utility gain in this case is 
) )( ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1
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A redistribution of w from individual 2 to 1 does not affect w
M. Hence, the increase in 1’s surplus 
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In the Nash Bargaining outcome, 1’s utility gain is given by  
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since each individual gets the same amount of w in equilibrium. Furthermore, w
B = w
M. 
The increase in 1’s surplus from a redistribution of w from 2 to 1 is given by 
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Comparing 20 and (21), and using the fact that  ) ( 2 1 2
1 O O M w w w + = , the result follows. 
 
  The convexity or concavity of v′ can be related to the coefficients of absolute and relative 
risk aversion, which were used in Proposition 2. For example, sufficient conditions for v′ to be 
convex are non-increasing absolute risk aversion, or non-increasing relative risk aversion greater 
than one. Thus, in the case of constant absolute risk aversion, the impact on individual 1’s 
surplus is greater in the case of the Nash bargaining outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
  The results presented in this paper are novel in precisely comparing the competitive 
market outcome with the Nash Bargaining outcome, albeit for particular cases of exchange 




are very different, not much has been written on understanding the nature of these differences.  
This paper provides some insights in this direction.   
  It may be observed that much of the "action" in the propositions comes from variations in 
the market outcome.  The NBS here involves just an equal split of the total gains from trade.  
One can generalize the NBS to allow for differences in bargaining power (e.g., Harsanyi and 
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− i's, which measure 
relative bargaining power, are normalized to sum to one, then individual i's share of a given 
surplus is equal to αi.  Given arbitrary exogenous αi's, the results of this paper can be suitably 
modified to this case.   
  As an example, to illustrate how one might proceed to incorporate general bargaining 
power, we may consider the two-person situation of Proposition 5. If α is individual 1's 
bargaining power, then the expression for 1’s utility gain is now 
(22)  .  )] ( ) ( ) ( 2 [ 2 1
O O B O
i
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If α is small enough, then even if marginal utility is strictly convex, the impact on 1’s utility gain 
of a redistribution of w from 2 to 1 would be lower in the Nash bargaining case than in the 
competitive market case. 
  An interesting question for future research is whether the αi's can be related to 
preferences or endowments in any systematic way.  Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) 
have related the bargaining strength parameters to time preferences or probability estimates of 
bargaining breakdown when the generalized NBS is viewed as an approximation to a Rubinstein 
(1982) alternating offers noncooperative bargaining model.  However, that approach does not 




approach, suppose that α equals the value of 1’s endowment (using the competitive market 
price), relative to the value of aggregate endowments. Then the redistribution of w from 2 to 1 
considered earlier will increase α in a quantifiable way,
6 which will affect to kind of comparison 
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